

Toward Building Collaborative Capacity: Assessment of Service Delivery in Makati Homeville, Laguna, Philippines

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ABSTRACT. This study assessed the service delivery in Makati Homeville (MH), Calauan in Laguna, Philippines. Specifically, it analyzed the perceived strength of the collaborative capacity of the Makati Social Welfare and Development-Extension Office (MSWD-EO) in the areas of accountability, outcomes, delivery and alignment, and proposed mechanisms by which service delivery can be scaled up to ensure sustainability. The Collaborate and United Nations Development Programme's Collaborative Capacity Framework was adopted to examine key areas of public service delivery where collaboration could be strengthened to ensure better outcomes. The perceived strength was measured by computing the mean scores of respondents' numerical rating for each statement. The data from qualitative sources were used to validate numerical data and track the historical development of MH. It was revealed that despite the collaborative initiatives taking place in MH, some basic services needed improvement, particularly access to livelihood, electricity, and potable water. The perceived strength of MSWD-EO's collaborative capacity was "strong" across key areas of service delivery. A closer examination of qualitative data, however, revealed some weak areas in the design (outcomes), risk (alignment), innovation (delivery), and transparency (accountability). Putting collaborative framework at work would require mobilizing substantial resources and overcoming constraints in project management. It is necessary that a framework for inter-local government relations governing off-city resettlement is formulated, approval of House Bill 5144 is secured, and a memorandum of agreement be signed between Makati and Calauan Local Government Units.

Keywords: *collaborative capacity, service delivery, collaborative capacity framework*

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INTRODUCTION

The rapid growth of urban population exacerbated by the insufficient capacity of the government to provide effective social and economic infrastructures has brought forth a number of development concerns in the Philippines. One of the most evident outcomes is the mushrooming growth of slums or informal settlements in urban areas (Lagman, 2011; Navarro, 2014; Ooi & Phua, 2007; Watkins, 2013). Approximately 51 percent of the total number of informal settler-families in the country are scattered in Metro Manila. These families settle in areas often classified as danger zones, such as riverbanks, railroad tracks, bay coast, and under the bridges. Their lack of legal claim over the land that they occupy expose them to deplorable conditions given the unsanitary environment, congestion, poor access to basic services, and inadequate urban infrastructures (Gilles, 2012; National Economic Development Authority; UN Habitat III, 2015).

In an attempt to manage urban population and ensure the safety of informal settlers, the Philippine government has largely concentrated on relocation measures within and outside the central cities (Choe & Laquian, 2008; Laquian, 2008; Peña, 2014)¹. Numerous policies have been enacted to ensure that socialized resettlement programs are carried out in observance of the standard conditions set forth by the international human rights law. It is, for instance, stipulated in the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act [RA] 7160) that the local government units shall provide “low cost housing and other mass dwelling” for homeless families.

The Housing and Urban Development Act (RA 7279) and Comprehensive and Integrated Shelter Finance Act (RA 7835) set forth the mechanism for comprehensive housing program and urban development as well as regular increase of annual appropriation for national shelter program, respectively. These policies also strongly recognize the role of civil society, communities, and private sectors in securing the delivery of basic services by collaborating with the government for short-term and long-term development projects. However, there have been no

¹Administrative and economic measures to manage or counter urban population growth vary across Asian countries. As part of the City Cluster Development Strategy in China and Vietnam, for instance, they follow an internal household registration system called “hukou” that restricts migration of rural dwellers to cities. There are also certain social and economic services that are limited to bonafide urban residents (Choe & Laquian, 2008). Similar to India, Pakistan, and Thailand, the Philippine government focuses on relocating informal settlers to other areas, often suburban.

clear stipulations as to the roles of implementing and receiving local government units (LGUs) in case of near-city or off-city resettlement. The Philippine Congress is yet to approve amendments to RA 7279 requiring “the local government unit that implements the relocation or resettlement and the concerned national government agencies...provide the other basic services and facilitiesⁱⁱ ... to the recipient local government unit where relocation or resettlement is located” (p.9).

In Ballesteros and Egana’s (2012) review of the National Housing Authority (NHA) resettlement program (2007-2011), they noted that on the average, NHA had allotted 79 percent of its annual budget for the resettlement of informal settlers in Greater Manila Area (94%) and outlying provinces (6%). This clearly suggests that on a per program basis, resettlement had been a priority over other NHA’s housing programs, such as slum upgrading, sites and services, completed/core housing, and medium rise housing. Resettlement expenditure is mainly divided into project development (including housing support), land acquisition, and other project-related capital outlay. By providing decent and affordable housing, adequate social services and livelihood opportunities, it is expected that the overall conditions of families in resettlement areas would be improved (Ballesteros & Egana, 2012).

However, from the review of news articles and development studies published online, contrary evidence emerged undermining service delivery in government-owned relocation sites.

The existing policies seemed to be futile as many relocatees within or outside metropolitan areas complained about: a) forced eviction from original abode to resettlement areas without proper transition; b) lack of consultation with affected families prior to relocation; c) poor facilities in relocation sites; d) poor access to livelihood opportunities; e) insufficient social services; f) limited financial assistance to maintain and improve housing projects; and g) environment-related concerns such as infectious diseases, flooding, and unsafe and unsanitary environment (Condeza, 2014; Brown, 2009; Dominguez & Ito, 2014; Ellao, 2013; Gonzales, 2013; Magkilat, 2014; Rodriguez, 2015; Ruiz, 2015; UN Habitat,

ⁱⁱThe other basic services and facilities include “health, education, communications, security, recreation, relief and welfare”.

2007). These problems were usually attributed to the limited capability of the government to fulfill its legal obligations, create long-term solution to poverty, and provide necessary facilities for the integration of relocatees in their new community. The local government, on the other hand, often complained about financial constraints making the provision of adequate social and economic services an elusive work plan. In effect, some relocatees opted to return to their original settlements where they could find better livelihood opportunities for their families.

This study generally sought to assess the quality of service delivery in the context of a resettlement area in Calauan, Laguna. Makati Homeville (MH) is a 40-hectare property owned and operated by the City Government of Makati. The Makati Social Welfare Department - Extension Office (MSWD-EO) serves as the primary delivery channel of government programs and services in the area. The perceived strength of MSWD-EO's collaborative capacity in service delivery was analyzed particularly in the areas of accountability, outcomes, delivery, and alignment. The need to scale up its collaborative capacity in each of these four areas was also examined based on the data gathered from quantitative and qualitative sources.

With reference to the testimony of Calauan Mayor Buenafrido Berris during the Senate hearing dated 5 May 2015, MH is classified as an LGU-owned property within another LGU. There is no memorandum of agreement (MOA) signed between the City Government of Makati and the Municipal Government of Calauan as to the role of each unit in the development of MH and its residents. Yet, despite the confusion over jurisdiction of MH, Mayor Berris claimed that they assume responsibility over all residents seeking assistance from the local government (whether registered voters or not). They also conduct compliance monitoring in MH with reference to the development plan submitted to them by the Makati City government.

Presently, MH shelters a total of 1,031 families evicted from danger zones (waterways) and illegal settlements in different areas of Makati in 2009 (MSWD-EO, 2013). Apart from the housing units, the entire compound has two-storey elementary school building, two-storey high school building, communal rest rooms, chapel, government office, and a covered court for recreational purposes. It also has an ample unfilled space suitable for farming and community gardening.

Almost 60 percent of the total number of households in MH were living with a monthly income of PhP3,000.00 and below. To help augment

their income, MSWD-EO provided livelihood projects and financial assistance including Food for Work, Cash for Work, Rice for Work, health insurance programs, cash gifts for senior citizens, medical/dental missions, burial assistance, and annual *Pamaskong Handog* (Christmas gift package). It also forged partnership with other organizations offering assistance that is aligned with its own development agenda. Thus, apart from MSWD-EO initiated programs, the relocatees were also receiving assistance from its service partners in public and business sectors and non-profit organizations (MSWD-EO, 2013). Yet still, there are multiple and complex issues in the community that necessitate forging wider cross-sectoral collaboration. More than one-third was compelled to leave their houses unoccupied and rent a small space in Manila so they could be closer to work and other potential sources of livelihood (MSWD-EO, 2013). Some of them are called the “weekenders” as they only go home to MH during weekends after a 5-day work in Metro Manila. This persists despite the number of on-going livelihood projects, social services, and financial assistance provided by the MSWD-EO and its partner organizations. Even more alarming is the alleged incidence of prostitution (sex for food), drugs and other criminal activities (e.g., stealing) involving children in the area due to poverty (Cinco, 2015). The residents also demand for a more reliable source of potable water and electric supply.

MSWD-EO would not be able to measure up to the demands of relocatees without effectively engaging stakeholders, innovating different areas of service delivery and forging strong collaborative networks. A systematic assessment of MSWD-EO service delivery in line with its collaborative capacity could lead to an understanding of its strengths as well as the areas that can be scaled up to ensure sustainability. This study was premised on Collaborate and United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) recently launched framework in public service delivery, which takes collaboration at the core of reform initiatives, particularly in the areas of “accountability, outcomes, delivery, and alignment” (Kippin, 2015, pp.2-3).

Considering the nature of issues confronting the Makati Homeville project, the framework’s emphases on promoting accountability, engaging the citizens throughout the cycle of service delivery, ensuring congruence of values among partner agencies, and prioritizing the needs and aspirations of the citizens were applicable in assessing the current state of public service delivery in the area. A comprehensive account of forces that either thwart or accelerate service delivery would significantly aid in aligning their actions to a path closer to

collaboration. The strategic lessons derived from on-going interventions could be instrumental in making necessary actions to effectively secure the needed social and economic infrastructures in the community. These could also help lay down the groundwork for sustaining MH toward becoming a strong and resilient resettlement community.

Theoretical Framework

This study adopted Collaborate and UNDP's Collaborative Capacity Framework in assessing the public service delivery in Makati Homeville. A well-functioning public sector that advocates strong collaboration and delivers adequate services aligned with the needs of the community is at the core of this delivery framework. This is premised on the assumption that the public sector cannot deal with the variety of community issues on its own. From the consolidated cases of collaboration among the government, private sectors, non-profit organizations and local communities in United Kingdom, Collaborate is able to map out crucial areas of public service delivery where collaboration has to take place and identify sets of factors (called enablers) supporting it. The framework is specifically designed to optimize the delivery of UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly those working in the local level. Kippin (2015) noted that this "can be discussed, adapted, and applied internationally" and can be further tailored by "those who want to make it happen on the ground" (p.4). It is, therefore, highly adaptive to match local conditions in countries like the Philippines where collaborative undertaking has already started its course. MSWD-EO had to deal with a range of complex issues in MH such as shifting government leadership, budget constraint, and increasing demand for services by the relocatees, which may have detrimental effects on the development process. The Collaborative Capacity Framework could be strategically operationalized to respond to these emerging complexities by working through the enablers in each of the four cyclical areas of service delivery (i.e. outcomes, alignment, delivery, and accountability).

The term "outcomes" pertains to the extent by which the end targets are co-developed by citizens putting their needs and aspirations ahead of other concerns. It specifically focuses on generating insights, brokering relationships, and designing interventions to achieve the set end target. Alignment, on the other hand, looks into how service providers innovate ways of working together with other service partners across sectors. It covers the role that new perspectives on "risk, incentives, and resources play in building effective delivery partnerships" (Kippin, 2015,




Figure 1. Collaborative capacity in public service delivery framework
(adopted from Collaborative Capacity Framework for Public Service Excellence
by Kippin, 2015)

p.7). Delivery focuses on the extent by which public services are delivered while ensuring that the actual process is aligned with the service goals. The framework maintained that “innovation, agility, and great leadership characterize the best and most sustainable delivery partnerships” (p.7). Lastly, accountability pertains to the ability of the service provider to share power with the citizens, disclose vital information and account for its own actions. It explores how collaboration in public service delivery can be sustained by evidence, engagement, and transparency. Kippin (2015) argued that effective collaboration could be cultivated in these four areas to secure better service delivery outcomes.

In examining the perceived strength of collaborative capacity, emphasis was given on MSWD-EO’s core and support services. The core services were further divided into two: a) legal intervention service for criminal cases involving children and minor community disputes; and b) institutional social welfare and development services. The support services were those initiated by service partners within and outside MH requiring assistance (i.e., manpower, monitoring) from MSWD-EO.

While it cannot be argued that collaboration was already taking place, there was a need to examine the quality and extent to which it was observed within and across different areas of service delivery. The study explored how MSWD-EO managed to sustain partnerships with different organizations from the government, business, and civil society (community and non-profit organizations). By stimulating and sustaining its collaborative capacity, it was assumed that MSWD-EO would be able to further multiply its lever in service delivery leading to improved outcomes. This would also result to a more empowered community, as relocatees are no longer considered mere recipients but active participants of service delivery.

METHODOLOGY

Location of the Study

This study was conducted in Makati Homeville (MH), a 40-hectare relocation site located in Barangay Dayap, Calauan (72.5 km away from Makati) in Laguna, Philippines. The site is divided into three phases with a total number of 56 blocks. Each enlisted informal settler-family was awarded a lot covering an area of 40-60 m². A total of 263,305.90 m² has been allotted for residential structures, which can accommodate more than 6,000 families. The MSWD-EO was established at Phase III near the elementary and high school buildings. It serves as the center for community activities in the site.

Data Collection

Data were collected through documentation review, interviews, focus group discussion (FGD), and self-administered survey. Two sets of self-administered questionnaires were used. The first questionnaire was designed for MSWD-EO, while the second questionnaire was for the 30 MH Home Owners' Association (HOA) officers, block leaders, and members. For the collaborative capacity scale, each of the four areas of service delivery had 15 activity statements or a total of 60 (five for each of the three enablers per area) statements. Each statement corresponded to the description of the specific enabler in the Collaborative Capacity Framework. The respondents were asked to put a check under the number that corresponded to how frequent the MSWD-EO performs the given activity statement (i.e., 5 - always; 4 - often; 3 - sometimes;



Figure 2. Community Map of Makati Homeville (Ladon, 2014)

2 - rarely; 1 - never; and 0 - I do not know). The documentation review, interview, and FGD were used to generate in-depth data and validate information obtained from the self-administered survey.

Data Analysis

The perceived strength of collaborative capacity was analyzed based on the computed average score of all activity statements corresponding to the enablers of each key service delivery area. Average scores were interpreted as follows: 1:00 - 1:80 = very weak, 1:81- 2:60 = weak, 2:61- 3:40 = moderate, 3:41- 4:20 = strong, and 4:21 - 5:00 = very strong. A higher score suggests stronger collaborative capacity.

The data collected from different sources were cross-examined to validate the accuracy of findings. The perceived strength of MSWD-EO's collaborative capacity was validated by comparing the results of both surveys with the data derived from FGDs and interviews. The latter allowed for a more interactive inquiry and discussion unfolding complex issues in the community that were not adequately covered, if not hidden, in survey findings. Data triangulation was also done to strengthen the research findings and amend inadequacies in one source.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Historical Development of Makati Homeville

Makati Homeville, popularly known as "Binay Compound," is a resettlement project for the informal settler-families living in high risk and government-owned areas in Makati city. The entire area is estimated to accommodate more than 6,000 families (Cinco, 2015; Frialde, 2015). There are 56 blocks from phases one to three but only 12 blocks have been occupied up to date. Included in the functional amenities that can be found in the area are MSWD-EO building, covered court, chapel, a building with eight communal comfort rooms and eight communal bathrooms, day care center, and school buildings both for elementary and high school levels (MSWD-EO, 2013).

Construction of the relocation site. In 2007, the Makati City government procured parcels of land in Barrio Santol, Barangay Dayap for the development of its socialized housing program. The total cost of site development was estimated at PhP140 M. Informal settler-

families began to transfer to the area in 2009 but most of them had to build their own makeshift houses as the construction of houses was not part of the city government's initial plan (Frialde, 2015). A review of existing documents revealed that development (i.e., physical, social, economic) was slow in the area for the first four years of operation. They lacked basic services including water and electricity. They had to rely on alternative sources like building water pump and tapping electricity from an outside source. The site was also far from the public market and health center. The financial assistance provided by MSWD-EO was not enough to sustain the needs of the relocatees and their families forcing more than 30 percent of them to live off-site. The City Government of Makati constructed 395 units of houses up to 2013. Around 235 families, however, are still living in makeshift houses as house construction in Phases 1 and 2 are not yet completed (Abad et al., 2014; Cinco, 2015).

Partnership and community building. In 2012, MSWD-EO started implementing livelihood trainings but these did not really lead to the creation of sustainable livelihood enterprises due to lack of strong market partners and insufficient start-up capital (Abad, 2014). To broaden their resource base and improve service delivery, MSWD-EO further forged partnership with different organizations in Laguna and Makati. The community, on the other hand, took an active turn by organizing "traditional" events including the celebration of the feast of Our Lady of Guadalupe, Simbang Gabi (Evening Mass), Christmas Party, and Youth Camp. These events have become the much-awaited annual festivities in the community up to this date.

It was not until 2014 when the MSWD-EO intensified its campaign to encourage relocatees to file official residency in Calauan, Laguna so they may avail the social services provided by the government in both municipal and provincial levels (Cinco, 2015). Ms. Maribel Lumang, former Makati City Social Welfare Development officer, explained in an interview with Philippine Daily Inquirer correspondent, Ms. Maricar Cinco, that it took a couple of years for some relocatees to register in Calauan, because they probably did not want to cut their residential ties with Makati.

Issues on inter-local governmental relations. When asked who has the jurisdiction over MH, Area Coordinator Rommel Ducay said openly, "This is now under the jurisdiction of Calauan but they still benefit from the services of Makati." There had been no clear agreement as to the joint legal responsibility of Makati and Calauan Local Government Units (LGUs) in the development of MH. The implementing

rules and regulations of RA 7279 has no specific provisions on the legal procedures involved in off-city or near-city relocation. Calauan Mayor Berris, during the Senate hearing last May 2015, expressed his confusion over inter-local government relations and requested the legislators to clarify standard rules to follow when an LGU has a property in another LGU. He reported that Makati LGU ignored the moratorium that they issued on MH in 2011 due to poor compliance to the development plan (i.e., supply of water and electricity) and still opted to send relocatees in the area. There was even an instance when he was not allowed to enter MH premises without clearance from Makati LGU.

Provision of basic services. The Makati City LGU secured the needed permits for the electrification of Makati Homeville during the last quarter of 2014. All areas covered by Phase 3 had ready access to electricity. Street lights had also been established replacing the solar street lights provided by Malayan Colleges Laguna in 2013. The Makati Engineering Office already conducted a pre-evaluation of housing units in Phases 1 and 2 for the power supply installation. A water line system design had also been installed in two housing units but was still subject to the approval of the Makati City engineer.

In response to the allegations that MH relocatees were severely neglected by Makati LGU, former MSWD Officer-in-Charge Ryan Barcelo claimed that they strictly adhere to the provisions of Urban Development and Housing Act (RA 7279). He explained in an interview with *The Philippine Star* correspondent Mike Frialde that the city government has been providing them livelihood skills training, financial assistance, leadership, values formation seminars, and other social welfare and development programs since they transferred in 2009 (Frialde, 2015). The then incumbent Vice President Jejomar Binay, on the other hand, went even further, asserting that the Makati Homeville project is a “model in the housing sector” (Macas, 2015). The long delay in the electrification of area, according to him, was due to the negligence of Twin Leaf Group Inc., the project’s contractor allegedly owned by the former Makati Vice Mayor Ernesto Mercado. Calauan Mayor Berris claimed that the Twin Leaf Group did not coordinate with the local government of Calauan properly in the actual development of Makati Homeville. Consequently, Twin Leaf Group, Inc. violated certain rules and regulations in the construction of functional amenities in the site. It also failed to pay 80-percent contractor’s tax as mandated by the Local Government Code (Frialde, 2015).

A total of 3,476 persons (630 families) were living in the area as of 2013. The average household size was six. Majority of the relocatees had low educational attainment and relied on low paying jobs. Ninety percent of them worked as drivers, construction workers, vendors, and house painters, while the remaining 10 percent was employed in government and private companies in Metro Manila, if not overseas (MSWD-EO, 2013). Other problems indicated in MH Comprehensive Plan that the community had been facing include: a) non-operational high school building, b) lack of household water connection, c) out-of-school youth, d) frequent incidence of theft, and e) gaps in security measures. Some families were still living in makeshift houses waiting for their opportunity to be provided with cemented housing units by the local government.

While these issues remained unresolved, there had also been notable changes taking place in the community through time (2012-2015). These were: a) establishment of MH Homeowners' Association (MHHOA) and block officers; b) strengthening of a cooperative; c) establishment of functional day care and elementary school; d) formation of *tagapamayapa* or peace officers; and e) implementation of various social, health, family, and livelihood services by MSWD-EO and partner organizations. The relocatees believed that the participation of business and public sectors and non-profit organizations outside MH presented ample opportunities for community development (MSWD-EO, 2013).

Figure 3 shows the authors' analysis of developments done in MH. The phases of development in MH was influenced by the resources allotted by the MSWD-EO and its partner organizations. There was a need to clarify the inter-local government relations of Makati and Calauan to ensure proper coordination of delivery of public services. Despite the changes that had occurred through time in different aspects of community life, MSWD-EO had to continuously meet the complex demands of the relocatees and solve problems as they arise. Poor access to viable employment and livelihood opportunities undermined other development services that MSWD-EO and its partner organizations were providing for the community. Almost 60 percent of the total number of households were still earning below PhP 3,000.00 every month. Any attempt to make MH a sustainable community would be futile without generating adequate sources of livelihood and improving the living conditions in the area. As a local social welfare and development agency, it was the primary role of MSWD-EO to formulate measures that would provide livelihood opportunities and improve living conditions of poor families in MH.




Figure 3. Timeline of On-site and Community Development in Makati Homeville (Source: Authors' Analysis)

Profile of Makati Social Welfare and Development Extension Office and its Partner Organizations

The Makati Social Welfare and Development Extension Office (MSWD-EO) was established in 2008 primarily to provide the needed assistance and facilitate development process in Makati Homeville. It is tasked to carry out social and development services until such time that the relocatees and their community are capable of meeting their own needs. MSWD-EO is under the Informal Settlers' Section of MSWD. As mentioned earlier, the services provided by MSWD can be generally classified into two: core services and support services. The core services pertain to institutional services initiated and managed by MSWD-EO for the benefit of the relocatees with the help of partner institutions. These services can be further divided into social and development services and legal intervention.

Social and development services pertain to those that are regularly offered to the relocatees to help them meet their needs and uplift their living conditions. These include Day Care Center, Cash for Work, Yellow Card (health card)ⁱⁱⁱ, Blue Card (for senior citizens)^{iv}, *Damayan* (mutual aid), and *Pamaskong Handog* (Christmas gift package). The values formation, skills training, and livelihood seminars initiated by MSWD-EO are also included in this category. The legal intervention service, on the other hand, points to their authority to mediate and settle disputes and problems involving children, their families, and the community at large (e.g., juvenile delinquency, family conflicts, loan disputes).

The support services pertain to those that are initiated by the partner-organizations which require the assistance of MSWD-EO. The decision of the MSWD-EO to approve the proposed services primarily depend on the required manpower to carry them out and, more importantly, to the extent by which these are aligned with the identified priority concerns of the community.

In 2013, MSWD-EO formulated seven pillars of community development (Table 1) that served as specific guidelines in their development work in Makati Homeville. Each guideline is carried out through a number of institutional services catering to all relocatees in the area.

The Cash for Work is offered to a maximum of 300 families every year. The beneficiaries receive cash assistance in exchange for the work that they render for the community. Some of these include cleaning up the streets and school, construction of community centers, and planting crops and ornamental garden plants. In 2014, MSWD-EO decided not to offer Rice for Work and Food for Work, and focus on Cash for Work instead since the relocatees preferred direct financial assistance. Food procurement and repacking also normally took longer time considering the required governmental process that had to be followed. Apart from the above-cited services, the relocatees also benefit from Day Care Center, Yellow Card, Blue Card, *Damayan*, and *Pamaskong Handog*. Yet Mr. Ducaay noted that they need financial assistance from other organizations to sustain these activities, especially those related to livelihood, health, values formation, and capability building.

ⁱⁱⁱYellow Card gives Makati residents access to free hospitalization in Makati. They are only required to give PhP200 as donation if hospital bill exceeds PhP5,000.00.

^{iv}Blue Card holder in MH receives cash gift twice a year from the City Government of Makati.

Table 1. MSWD-EO seven pillars of community development and the corresponding institutional services

PILLAR OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT	INSTITUTIONAL SERVICES
1. Strong community organizing	▪ Monitoring of Makati Homeville Homeowners' Association and block officers' general monthly meeting
2. Participatory governance	▪ Cash for work ▪ Food for work ▪ Rice for Work
3. Livelihood and access to market	▪ Livelihood trainings (e.g., trainings on beauty care, wellness massage, paper briquette making, rug making, straw bag making, and pineapple jam making) ▪ Establishment of cooperative
4. Gender sensitivity	▪ Responsible parenting seminar
5. Ecological sustainability	▪ Implementation of Zero Plastic Policy ▪ Establishment of materials recovery facility (MRF) ▪ Street beautification
6. Food security	▪ Organic farming
7. Health (hygiene and sanitation)	▪ Feeding program

For eight years, MSWD-EO has worked together with ten organizations/institutions within and outside Makati Homeville. The key players for inter-sectoral collaboration prescribed by Collaborate and UNDP's Collaborative Capacity Framework are all represented in MSWD-EO's list of partner institutions: a) two community organizations, b) one from the private sector, c) two from the public sector, and d) five non-profit organizations.

Forging collaboration with organizations within and outside Makati Homeville is not without problems. Issues encountered are often due to unclear agreements when it comes to project monitoring and reporting in which, if not properly addressed, lead to strained relationships among partners or even termination of joint projects. In fact, of these 10 partners, only six have remained active as of January 2016.

Perceived Strength of MSWD-EO Collaborative Capacity

In the self-administered survey, the respondents were asked to check the number that corresponds to how frequent they think MSWD-EO performs the given activity statements. This part was further divided into four thematic areas with three enablers each. Five activity statements for each enabler were given, adding to a total of 60 statements. The results were analyzed based on the computed average score of each activity statement. A higher score was an indication of stronger collaborative capacity. These were validated through the data obtained from interviews and FGD. The discussion below and Table 2 present the strength of collaborative capacity for each thematic area as perceived by MHHOA officers, block leaders, and MSWD-EO Area Coordinator.

Table 2. Perceived strength of MSWD-EO’s collaborative capacity
in the four areas of service delivery

THEMATIC AREA	ENABLER	AVERAGE SCORE	INTERPRETATION
Outcomes	Insight	4.04	Strong
	Design	3.88	Strong
	Brokerage	4.35	Very Strong
	General average	4.09	Strong
Alignment	Risk	3.54	Strong
	Incentive	3.87	Strong
	Resources	3.68	Strong
	General average	3.71	Strong
Delivery	Agility	4.06	Strong
	Innovation	3.91	Strong
	Leadership	3.76	Strong
	General average	3.91	Strong
Accountability	Evidence	3.71	Strong
	Engagement	3.95	Strong
	Transparency	3.61	Strong
	General average	3.75	Strong

Outcomes. The respondents' perceived strength of MSWD-EO collaborative capacity in promoting outcomes was "strong" (4.09). All the three enablers fell within the "strong" interval scale.

Of the three enablers, "brokerage" was perceived to be the enabler where MSWD-EO demonstrated the strongest collaborative capacity (4.35). This was consistent with data obtained from interviews and FGD. The MSWD-EO organizers, based on their extensive knowledge of the community, examined first whether or not the people were willing and able to participate in the proposed project before embarking into collaborative partnership. Mr. Ducay, for instance, declined the proposed feeding program of a non-profit organization knowing that the community officers could not meet its demands. The community officers were invited to participate whenever partner-institutions presented their proposed projects and detailed out the process involved in the implementation. They were also given opportunity to provide alternative measures if they were not amenable to the established plan. An informant from the private sector-partner, for instance, recalled that they had to change the initial layout of solar street lights installation because the community volunteers could not understand the blue print that the engineering students prepared for them. The volunteer carpenters preferred the traditional way of setting up structures, which they were accustomed to do.

MSWD-EO organizers also continuously looked for partner institutions or individual donors to help them improve the delivery of existing services. They created opportunities wherein the relocatees could work together with those from the other blocks in community activities (e.g., organic farming, sports events).

"Insight" got the second highest average score (4.04) in this thematic area. It basically looked into the capacity of MSWD-EO to explore deeply into the needs and aspirations of the people. The result can also be considered consistent with the data obtained from other sources. The Office was required to prepare census and needs assessment report for submission to DSWD-Makati before launching institutional services. Since Mr. Ducay was a beneficiary of the program and lives within the community, it was relatively easy for him to know the personal needs, wants, and aspirations of his fellow relocatees. He can go into the minute details of their personal lives even those that are already beyond the realm of public service. When he learned about what happened to the three victims of illegal recruitment, for instance, he immediately acted upon it even if it is no longer the responsibility of social welfare service.

MSWD-EO also conducted asset and resource mapping which they used in building the community further.

Although “design” got the lowest average score (3.88) in this area, it was still rated “strong” by the respondents. The results, however, were not consistent with the data obtained from interviews with MSWD-EO and partner institutions. In reality, MSWD-EO and partner-institutions did not conduct pilot-testing of the programs and services. When asked to discuss the common process they observed in conceptualizing and implementing their services, Mr. Ducay made no mention putting them first into small-scale trial. The same observation can be derived from interviews with representatives of its private and community organization partners. The relocatees had no participation in the initial design of programs and services launched by MSWD-EO and their partner institutions.

The design of institutional programs and services offered by MSWD-EO normally came from the main office in Makati. The partner-institutions usually come to the community with a concrete design plan for their proposed projects. The participation of the community was limited on the final presentation and consultation. It is, therefore, surprising that the beneficiaries rated MSWD-EO strong in this enabler. The relocatees may have equated participation in public consultation with involvement in project design.

Alignment. Similar to “outcomes,” the respondents believed that MSWD-EO had shown “strong” (3.71) collaborative capacity in innovating ways to work together with service partners across sectors. Each of the three enablers also fell within the “strong” interval scale.

The Office was perceived to be strongest in creating incentives for collaboration (3.87). The result was consistent with the information obtained through qualitative sources. MSWD-EO ensured that collaborative partnerships would be beneficial to the community. It was also important for them that the core values of the partner organizations were aligned with their own and that they were moving toward the same goal. When a non-profit organization-partner, for example, decided to limit the number of their relief goods to 300 partner-families, Mr. Ducay strongly objected knowing that there were more than 600 affected families in the area (based on his survey after the typhoon). After a series of discussions, Mr. Ducay was able to convince the partner-organization to provide relief goods to all affected families. The MSWD-EO also

provided partner-organizations equal opportunity to make decisions on how projects must be carried out. Upon closer scrutiny, however, it was revealed that MSWD-EO still has no clear incentive schemes for service partners. Community volunteers were usually just given food and gifts for assisting in the implementation of projects. For service partners outside MH, what they could offer mainly were technical and manpower support in implementing their proposed project.

It was in generating resources that the Office got the second highest score in building collaborative capacity. Based on interviews, FGDs, and review of existing sources, it can be said that the results for this enabler category were keenly observed by MSWD-EO in practice. The organizers actively looked for service partners and explored various means to get the people involved in community projects. In cases where the emergent need was not supported by the main office, Mr. Ducay and some volunteers would find other sources of funds on their own. To encourage volunteerism and active participation of relocatees in community activities (e.g., Zumba, organic farming, formation seminars), they guaranteed that doing so would be greatly beneficial to them and their families.

Risk got the lowest average score in this area. The respondents, nonetheless, rated MSWD-EO “strong” (3.54) in terms of promoting collaboration in managing risk. Upon closer scrutiny, this unfortunately can be considered the most neglected enabler of alignment in terms of collaborative practice. An informant from its private sector-partner, for instance, admitted that they did not disclose and examine potential risk of partnership with MSWD-EO (or vice versa) before entering an agreement with them. She never expected that the City Government of Makati would go through such a political crisis affecting the implementation of some of their projects. The installation of solar-powered water pump designed by engineering students, for example, had been put into a halt while waiting for the approval of the Makati City Engineering Office. Even the MSWD-EO Coordinator admitted that potential risks of collaboration were not brought up in their meetings/discussions with the service partners.

Delivery. With a general average of 3.91, MSWD-EO was perceived to have “strong” collaborative capacity in service delivery. None of the enablers got an average score below 3.91; thus, all were rated “strong”.

Of the three enablers in this area, the Office got the highest score in “agility” (4.06). As mentioned earlier, the organizer usually conducted network mapping in an attempt to broaden their resource base for the community. With the political crisis in the city government, shifting leadership, and security of tenure in the balance, there was a strong pressure for Mr. Ducay to cope with the changes in policies. He had to report to Makati for more than a week for a debriefing immediately after the unanticipated relief of his supervisor. Yet, he managed to continue the operation and delivery of services in Makati Homeville even in the absence of a support staff. MSWD-EO and service partners also explored innovative ways in improving public service delivery in MH. However, these were largely limited by the support provided by the main office. Even if the priority areas of concern were clearly stipulated in MSWD-EO reports, the decision on what project to prioritize was determined by the administrators of MSWD. For instance, although water and electricity supply was identified as a priority concern, it could not be considered a priority program without the approval of the main office.

For innovation, MSWD-EO was still rated “strong” by the respondents in terms of its capacity to collaborate. Data gathered through qualitative sources, however, proved otherwise. The programs and services currently offered by MSWD-EO were largely the same as those they were providing three years ago. As earlier noted, the line of services provided for MH largely depended on the approval of MSWD administrators. This inevitably limited the capacity of the community organizers to conceptualize innovative services they deemed fit for the relocatees. Moreover, their desire to challenge the old and established ways of service delivery was also largely constrained with what was considered appropriate by the main office.

The “leadership” enabler got a rating of 3.76 in this area. The perceived strength of collaborative capacity in all activity statements were consistent with the actual events in the field. Although monitored, MSWD-EO gave the community organizations ample opportunity to work on their own projects. Emerging community and personal issues could not be settled without bringing them first to the attention of people concerned. In case of theft involving youth, MSWD-EO gathered both parties and acted as mediator to help them arrive at a common decision.

Accountability. Similar to the three thematic areas mentioned earlier, the respondents believed that the MSWD-EO demonstrated “strong” (3.75) collaborative capacity in promoting accountability. All three enablers were also rated “strong” with average scores ranging from 3.61 to 3.95.

It was in “engagement” where MSWD-EO demonstrated the strongest collaborative capacity in this area. Only the response from one statement - they follow a specific procedure in forging public-private partnership in public service delivery - seemed to be inconsistent with the actual collaborative practices observed by MSWD-EO. The Office had not yet established a standard system in forging strong “public-private partnership”. MSWD-EO collaborated with other organizations based on the personal knowledge and acquired experiences of staff in development work. Surprisingly, this statement was rated strong by the respondents.

Mr. Ducay managed to maintain close relationship with the residents and mobilized them to participate in community activities. There were also elected community officials who helped him lead in the delivery of public service. When issues arose, MSWD-EO normally settled the problem by gathering the concerned people together to know more about their needs and aspirations. Not all people, however, would say the same thing about MSWD-EO. Some claimed that the Office favored one group of people over the other. This was one big challenge that also appeared in another sub-section of this research warranting proper attention.

The “evidence” got the second highest average score (3.71) in this area. The perceived strength of collaborative capacity in most activity statements was consistent with the information derived from qualitative sources. Upon examination of how project assessments were conducted by the MSWD-EO and its partner-organizations, it can be said that they did not practice collaborative assessments during and after project implementation.

Only the two non-profit organization-partners that provided feeding programs and educational assistance involved the beneficiaries in assessing the outcomes of the intervention. Most organizations performed mid and post assessments on their own without engaging the beneficiaries.

Of the three enablers, it was “transparency” that got the lowest score (3.61) in this thematic area. While MSWD-EO clearly announced their limits in decision-making and explained to the community the primary considerations in the decision that they made, the public had no ready access to pertinent documents concerning the progress taking place in Makati Homeville (e.g., electrification, water supply). There was no official area where people can have access to financial reports, summary of accomplishments, development plans, and other documents showing the current condition in Makati Homeville and what the Makati LGU through MSWD-EO was doing about it.

From the consolidated information obtained from survey, interviews, documentary reviews, and focus group discussion, it can be said that MSWD-EO collaborative capacity was strongest in “outcomes” and weakest in “alignment.” In all thematic areas, however, there were also specific enablers that require immediate attention by the MSWD-EO such as design (outcomes), risk (alignment), innovation (delivery), and transparency (accountability).

Applying Collaborative Capacity Approach in Scaling-Up MSWD-EO’s Public Service Delivery

The Collaborate and UNDP’s Collaborative Capacity Approach was developed to improve public service delivery based on rising consumer demand. For this subsection, emphasis is given on how MSWD-EO public service delivery can be strengthened by building collaborative capacity in all the identified four elements and their enablers.

Outcomes

Insight. MSWD-EO has to respond immediately to emerging suspicions that they are not giving equal treatment to all. It can be done by scheduling frequent visits to each block and listening to their viewpoints and concerns. Due to resource constraint, MSWD-EO cannot deliver services to all relocatees. Hence, they have to involve the community leaders in creating criteria for selection of beneficiaries. The approved criteria must be properly communicated to all. The formulated strategies for service delivery must produce outcomes that are meaningful to the relocatees and their community.

Design. The Office should conduct pilot testing of programs and services with the community officers so they will know certain aspects that require improvement. It is also crucial to include the beneficiaries in the entire phase of program design. Unlocking their collaborative skills can be obtained by empowering them to make decisions for their lives. Collaborative capacity approach puts the relocatees at the core of service delivery; thus, they should have specific decision making roles in every phase of the program cycle.

Design-related thinking capability must be developed among MSWD-EO organizers. This is basically about creating value on public services through regular interaction with the community concerned.

Brokerage. The MSWD-EO should continue monitoring the conduct of regular meetings of MHHOA officers, block leaders, and all working committees. These meetings/consultations serve as their shared space where people can set aside their differences, work collaboratively, and set common outcomes for the group. There has to be a specific office area allotted for MHHOA and block officers (instead of using different rooms in the school building). MSWD-EO should develop in them the necessary skill-set for institutional entrepreneurs. They also have to strengthen the Youth Club in the community to assist them in organizing events.

Alignment

Risk. MSWD-EO and its partner institutions must be willing to adopt a culture of risk readiness. Instead of avoiding risk, both parties must be honest and open to discuss it so they can have a planned response that can minimize, if not eliminate, its adverse effects in the community.

Risk identification must be an integral part of the initial discussions before forging partnerships. In the planning process, it would be helpful to conduct Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analysis involving all stakeholders. SWOT analysis could be an effective planning tool evaluating the possible effect of both internal (SW) and external (OT) environment.

Incentive. The Office must create a strong incentive scheme that will motivate organizations and service users to collaborate with them. The general welfare of the relocatees based on information gathered from personal interaction with them must always be the ultimate priority when making agreements with other organizations.

Resources. Although MSWD-EO has shown diligence in looking for service partners, what they usually target are those who can give them immediate assistance for their projects. What they need to develop is the skill to forge and sustain long-term collaborative partnership that will have a significant impact in the community. They have to expand their reach not only in Laguna and Manila but also abroad.

Delivery

Agility. The flow of service delivery must not be delayed or halted by the frequent changing of administrations. However, any attempt to innovate ways to improve service delivery will be in vain without the support of those in the top management. The Office must be able to communicate with the relocatees about their priority programs to avoid confusion and conflict.

The flow of communication with the Informal Settlers' Section including MSWD-EO must be improved allowing each one to openly articulate one's thinking without the fear of being ridiculed.

Innovation. Challenging the old ways to get things done and creating new ways to achieve outcomes can only have significant impact insofar as this is supported by the main office. Mr. Ducay has to systematically think about how he will communicate his planned change in service delivery to his superiors to finally win their support. Yet they should always be willing to talk about the potential risk of planned change.

Leadership. When issues with project partners arise, MSWD-EO must persistently ask for regular consultation and discussion with them until everything is settled. A collaborative leader is willing to share power with service partners in program implementation. He also has to acquire essential skills (e.g., mediating, influencing, engaging) and show consistency in building and sustaining partnerships across sectors.

Accountability

Evidence. A real-time multi-methodological approach must be followed in gathering the needed data in the community. The beneficiaries must always be involved in all phases of project assessment. MSWD-EO must continue gathering information from the community to improve service delivery. It is also crucial to clarify conflicting information about an issue in the community by evaluating sources and arguments along with the people concerned.

Engagement. The citizens are at the core of collaborative approach. Hence, they must be involved in every stage of the project management cycle. The relocatees, though cooperative in community activities, are often divided by ethos, interests, place of origin (i.e. barangay) and ways of doing things. Without proper intervention, this may lead to unproductive alliances. This can be addressed by allowing them to engage in activities or projects that require working with those outside their sub-groups. In establishing private-public partnership, however, a clear standard procedure must be set to minimize risk and ensure effective management of joint projects.

Transparency. MSWD-EO should be able to publish or post financial reports and other relevant documents that will help the participants check the real status of development work in the area. In the final interview with Mr. Ducay, he recommended the setting up of bulletin board in the lobby of the office where he can post announcements, reports, and other pertinent records of MHHOA, block leaders, and MSWD-EO.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study primarily sought to assess the service delivery in Makati Homerville focusing on MSWD-EO's collaborative capacity. Numerical data revealed that the perceived strength of MSWD-EO's collaborative capacity across the thematic areas and enablers was "strong" with a general average of 3.87. Its collaborative capacity was highest in "outcomes" and lowest in "alignment". However, when survey data were triangulated with different sets of qualitative data, there emerged certain weak areas requiring immediate attention from MSWD-EO. These include design (outcomes), risk (alignment), innovation (delivery), and transparency (accountability).

Putting collaborative framework at work would require mobilizing substantial resources and overcoming a lot of constraints in project management (i.e., budget, time, manpower.) It is imperative that the relocatees be at the center of all key areas in public service delivery. Forging a strong collaboration, however, warrants a great deal of commitment from all stakeholders across sectors, particularly the service users (relocatees). Equally important, the service providers and service users must share closer level of personal relationship, sense of responsibility, and high level of trust. The framework needs a pool of empowered citizens who are willing and capable to go beyond their personal concerns and work together with fellow citizens and service providers. In the case of MSWD-EO, enhancing their collaborative capacity requires serious rethinking on how they package their institutionalized services. Despite the perceived political instability in Makati in 2015, MSWD-EO, as a mediator between relocatees and the Makati LGU, can still earn a high level of trust from the relocatees by improving transparency in governance and increasing their visibility and interaction with them. Once a high level of trust is built between MSWD-EO and relocatees, it will be easier to raise the involvement of the latter in service delivery. MSWD-EO must also ensure continuous monitoring of MHHOA and elected block leaders' meetings and community activities, and employ concrete incentive scheme for participation. In the process, this will create a ripple effect across key areas of public service delivery.

The assessment of service delivery in Makati Homeville revealed inherent issues in the existing policies covering government-owned socialized housing projects. It is thus recommended that policy makers, service providers and other sectors concerned take the following into consideration:

1. *Formulate a legal framework for inter-local governmental relations in off-city resettlement projects.* The Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Administrative Order No. 270) merely sets the procedures for entering into inter-local government cooperative undertaking putting other related matters into contention. There must be a separate framework covering the principles, functions, powers, and rules when a local government unit establishes a property in an area outside its jurisdiction. As earlier cited, Calauan Mayor Berris raised the question of jurisdiction over relocation sites in his locality during the Senate hearing in May 2015. Both Makati LGU and NHA violated the moratorium that he issued on relocation. He then called for the review of inter-local governmental policy to avoid similar problems in the future.

2. *Secure the approval of the House Bill 5144 or the “On-site, In-City, Near-City Resettlement Act.”* The Urban and Housing Development Act (RA 7279) primarily focuses on in-city resettlement overlooking the complexities of off-city or near-city resettlement projects. There is no clear provision on the process involved in implementing the latter – a problem that House Bill 5144 seeks to address. The pending bill amends RA 7279 by specifying the legal responsibilities of sending and receiving LGUs over the relocated informal settler-families, making them active partners of the local government and providing for the development and implementation of “People’s Plan,” among others. Considering the complex issues surrounding resettlement projects, this must be considered as one of the priority bills in the Philippine Congress.

3. *Develop memorandum of agreement between the Local Government Units of Makati and Calauan.* To clarify the roles of both local government units in the Makati Homeville project and avoid any further confusion, it is recommended that the Local Government Units of Makati and Calauan begin negotiating the terms and conditions of their partnership. These will have to be embodied in a memorandum of agreement. Such agreement also has to set forth the scope of their responsibilities in delivering public services for Makati Homeville.

In the end, it must be emphasized that service delivery reforms promoting inter-sectoral collaboration should be anchored on the principle of participatory governance. Making decisions in enabling areas where MSWD-EO was observed to be weak warrants broad and active participation of stakeholders particularly the relocatees. As espoused in all other participatory developmental approaches, Collaborative Capacity Framework requires that service delivery be “citizen-based” where decision is reached through extensive negotiations and agreements. While issues inevitably arise in the process, these can be minimized by creating greater opportunities where stakeholders can set aside divisions, identify possible risks of partnerships, promote innovation, and ensure that vital information in service delivery is available to all. These largely ensure that services are delivered for the maximum benefit of the community.

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